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SUMMARY
Based on unclassified sources, a general review is presented of some military
needs in light of the perceived U.S.S.R. doctrine, force balances, inventory growth,
inventory items, and current actions. The Soviets appear to be attempting to increase
their sphere of influence through economic and political control as well as possible
military control of land, sea, air, and space. To offset such possibilities, certain
areas of deterrent needs that the Western World might pursue are suggested. Particu-
lar emphasis is placed on the role of research and technology related to aerospace
systems as part of the deterrent needs.
INTRODUCTION
The social and economic programs of the Soviet Union have been accompanied by the
buildup of a powerful military force. A clear understanding of this force is essen-
tial to the shaping of the free world response. This paper does not represent a NASA
view but examines the actions of the Soviet Union in light of the Department of Defense
document IISoviet Military Power. 1I Other sources of information drawn on are listed in
the bibliography. The role of research and technology related primarily to aerodynamic
systems as part of a deterrent force to offset potential Soviet capabilities will be
considered.
THE SOVIET VIEW
According to the Soviet view, world leadership and technological superiority are
directly proportional. It is clear that among the important Soviet stratagems to
gain their achievement of world science leadership has been to invest heavily in the
training and development of professional manpower, to plan effectively for the use of
the resources available, and to avail themselves of external technology by any means
possible.
Some of the major Soviet thrusts are:
o Homeland defense - long stated as the reason for the Soviet military buildup,
continues to grow asa 1and- and air-based ~stem but is also expanding to
include sea-based systems and perhaps space systems.
o Multiple projection of power - new items of military equipment now indicate
more than homeland defense by providing the potential to project power by air
and sea to points far distant from the homeland.
o Rapid deployment and mobility - a theme substantiated by the kind of military
equipment being fielded.
o Increased amphibious capability marked by new classes of ships, helicopters,
and surface-effects landing craft--a force not generally thought of as
defensive but rather for offensive power projection.
o Improved logistic support with a variety of aircraft and helicopter types
(including the assets of Aeroflot). The Soviet merchant marine is also among
the world's largest ocean-going fleets.
o Expansion is a practice of gaining a measure of control into other territory
(Afghanistan, Cuba) without given rise to other than a passive response from
the free world.
o Sea power is one of the "~st rapidly growing components of the Soviet arlned
forces having changed over the past two decades from a force of little signif-
icance to perhaps tile world's most powerful Navy. Soviet doctrine states that
the primary missions of the Navy are to display the capability of launching
nuclear missile strikes, conducting Navy air antishipping strikes, conducting
sea battles to gain sea control, and to assist ground forces in operation.
With the advent of ever-increasing numbers of vessels (including nuclear-
powered), and with the availability of ports in strategic worldwide locations,
the Soviet Navy, for some time, has been spending more ship-days out-of-area
than has the u.S. Navy.
Such an array of Soviet thrusts could lead to a worldwide offensive capability
for the U.S.S.R. with the ability to control theater warfare remote from the homeland
and to operate with versatility and mobility in quantity. Soviet systems that are
already in evidence or that might reasonably be expected in order to add credence to
the apparent thrusts include:
o Long-range high-speed interceptor as a defense against air-launched cruise
missile carriers and possibly as an additional antishipping system.
o Long-range air-to-air missiles to fulfill the interceptor air intercept role.
o Long-range air-to-surface missiles to add to antishipping capability or to
possibly support ground attack.
o Improved V/STOL for Navy shipboard use or restricted air base use.
o Navy carrier aircraft to accompany large carriers currently under construction.
o WIG patrol - wing-in-ground-effect vehicle to provide long-endurance, large-
area sea patrol missions for ASW. Also, a possible logistic vehicle.
o Long-range manned bomber for strategic strikes or added antishipping capability.
A prototype (RAM P, Blackjack) was discovered in November 1981.
o Enhanced space systems for both the further use of space and the denial of the
use of space to others.
o Advanced Naval systems to provide power projection to any point on the globe
and attempt to control the sea lanes. One of the goals of sea-land control
would be to shut off the flow of critical raw materials.
Possible Problem Areas
Strategic penetrability.- As illustrated in figure 1, strategic penetration with
current manned systems could pose some problem areas. Although the U.S. had a
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•numerically superior bomber force at the end of 1980, the number of U.S.S.R.
interceptor aircraft and land-based SAM launchers could make penetration difficult.
The possible addition of sea-based SAM launchers on Soviet ships such as the Kirov-
class cruiser could only compound the problem. Soviet bombers, although less in
numbers, would face a somewhat limited defensive system. The inclusion of Backfire
bombers (not considered as part of the strategic bomber force) would further enhance
the Soviet penetrating capability.
Kirov cruiser.- The Kirov-class cruiser (fig. 2) is potentially capable of a
variety of missions including possible use as a sea-based SAM launcher. Among the
array of armament are twelve vertical launchers which may contain a Navy version of
the SA-10 strategic missile (SA-N-6). The SA-10 is thought to be about a M= 6
missile for rapid intercept of cruise missiles at low to medium altitudes. Such a
defensive sea-based system would be an effective way to extend the protection against
long-range cruise missiles to substantial distances from the homeland and at ranges up
to about forty miles from the launcher.
Naval balance.- One measure of Naval balance is depicted in figure 3 based on
available data through 1980. The number of major surface ships as well as submarines
is somewhat greater for the U.S.S.R. than that for the U.S. The U.S. does, of course,
have a numerical lead in aircraft carriers at the present time and, consequently a
lead in ship-based aircraft. However, the U.S.S.R. has a substantial numerical lead
in shore-based Naval aircraft, the bulk of which are dedicated to antishipping. The
U.S.S.R. also has a notable lead in antishipping missiles including numbers of types,
warhead, size, range, and speed.
U.S.S.R. Capability Summary
Soviet commitment to military equipment has led to:
o Numerical superiority (and possible narrowing of technology gap).
o Potential for the control of ground, air, sea, space, and strategic materials.
o Potentially increased adventurism or boldness.
o Possible denial of oversea basing to the U.S.
If it became necessary to conduct military operations from the continental U.S., the
distances involved become significant--on the order of 4000-8000 miles (fig. 4). For
a creditable deterrent force, capable of reaching military targets within the Soviet
Union, for example, ranges on the order of 1000 to 2500 miles would be required, even
from the Soviet border, in order to reach the majority of the targets (fig. 5).
WESTERN RESPONSE TO SOVIET CAPABILITY
Needs Summary
• Consideration of the potential impact of Soviet capability on the free world
leads to some specific needs. These needs include:
o Creditable deterrent - meaning the perceived, if not the actual, ability to
generate a response such that a potential attacker would choose not to attack.
o Rapid, flexible, worldwide response - meaning the ability to respond essen-
tially instantaneoulsy to any point on the globe.
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o Meaningful payload - meaning that the fractional weight devoted to payload
should be enough to provide damaging lethality in the case of munitions, or in
the case of logistics, sufficient supplies to sustain a protracted presence if
need be.
o Penetrability - a challenging area for innovative thought in view of the
potential defense.
o Fleet defense - to provide for the survival of the fleet against a steadily
improving Soviet force.
o CONUS defense - to reequip an almost nonexistent homeland defensive force to
offset a steadily growing U.S.S.R. capability to penetrate U.S. territory.
o Antishipping - sufficient to incapacitate a rapidly growing Soviet Naval force
capable of sea contol.
o Space control - to provide the ability to maintain operable systems in space
and to eliminate hostile space systems.
Vehicle Requirements
Vehicle requirements that are dictated by the apparent needs include:
0 Airplane/missile mix 0 Hasing flexibility
0 Long range 0 Endurance
0 High speed 0 Survi vabi 1ity
0 Volumetric efficiency 0 Affordability
Vehicle Categories
Certain vehicle categories that warrant a new look can be determined from the
needs and requirements. These categories include:
..
•
o Advanced Fighters
Strike/Attack (Sea/Land Based)
Sea Based Fleet Uefense
Tactical
MISSILES
o Strategic Cruise
Antishipping
Antisubmarine
Penetrator/Strike
o Tactical
Air Uefense (Fleet/Ground)
Ground Support
Ai r Superi ority
Uefense Suppression
ABM
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AIRPLANES
o Long Range Combat
Penetrator
Cruise Missile Carrier
Interceptor
Logistic/Reece/Tanker
o Advanced V/STUL
o Helicopter
Hea vy Li ft
Attack
SPACE
o Single Stage to Orbit
Space Stat ion
Ant i-Sate11 ite
Satell ite
UTHEI<
WIG
SEV
Air cushion
,Missile types such as strategic cruise missiles for antishipping, antisubmarine, and
penetration/strike and advanced tactical misiles for air defense (both land and sea),
ground support, defense suppression, air superiority, and antiballistic missile (both
strategic and tactical battlefield ballistic missiles) should have increased range,
speed, lethality, and launch flexibility compared to current systems.
Long range combat airplanes for use in penetration, antishipping, intercept, and
various support functions such as logistics, reconnaissance, and tanker may be rela-
tively large. In some cases, these airplanes could exceed the million-pound weight
category. Fighter aircraft include strike/attack, both sea- and land-based, fleet
defense, and tactical air superiority/ground support types and would require better
range, speed, maneuver, and basing flexibility than current fighters. Other airplane
types include advanced V/STOL and helicopter.
Other vehicle types that merit consideration range from various space systems to
near-earth specialized systems such as wing-in-ground effect (WIG), surface effect
vehicles (SEV), or air cushion vehicles.
WEAPONS SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
In addressing the potential Soviet capability, a variety of needs, requirements,
and vehicle types have been suggested. In many cases, a missile or a missile/airplane
combination seems appropriate as a means of meeting the needs. While it is not the
purpose of this paper to define operational tactics, an attempt will be made to
define the rationale for the use of some airplane and missile systems. A review of
the vehicle requirements previously listed indicates that many of the requirements·
could be favorably influenced by some combinations of features that are inherent to
different systems. A basic consideration to remember is that a missile is expendable
while a manned vehicle is not. This consideration leads to some missions where maxi-
mum use should be made of missiles or of missile/airplane, missile/ship combinations.
Affordability.- Missiles, by the nature of their throw-away role, should be con-
ceived with as little complexity as possible. Innovation and simplicity need not be
in opposition. By exercising some thought, relatively simple designs might be con-
ceived that could perform difficult missions. In areas of materials, structures, pro-
pulsion, manufacturing techniques, and undoubtedly many others, certain simplistic
approaches could be pursued because of the expendable nature and relatively short
life of a missile. In other words, designing to specific mission requirements without
the constraints of man-rating or reusability could lead to reduced cost.
Survivability.- Missiles, without the constraints of man-rating, are readily
adaptable to features conducive to survivability such as high-speed, small-size,
high- and low-altitude options.
Long range/endurance.- Partly due to the one-way mission of a missile, the range
can be maximized. In addition, through the use of various booster arrangements and
through the packaging of more fuel (without man constraints), greater range and/or
endurance is enhanced. In the case of airlaunch, the carrier aircraft should provide
the maximum stand-off distance for launch.
Volumetric efficiency.- Lack of man constraints and such subsystems as might be
required for vehicles that take off and return to land, the volume of a missile may
be used more efficiently for fuel or ordinance that contribute more to the effec-
tiveness of the system.
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Strategic penetration.- Because of seemingly formidable defensive systems, a
missile would appear to be a likely weapon for strategic penetration from the stand-
point of survivability. Long-range capability, which is desirable for penetration,
is more easily accomplished by a missile which needs to go only one way from a maxi-
mum stand-off launch position. In addition, high-speed capability at high altitude
(and perhaps at low altitude) as well as smaller size for reduced detectability is
more easily achieved with missile systems. Such systems obviously are not without
problems not the least of which are target detection and terminal homing.
Tactical penetration.- Battlefield penetration against massed armor and troops
both at relatively close ranges and at relatively long ranges are roles suitable for
missiles. A possible concept, particularly for territory that is known to be occupied
by unfriendly forces, could be an extremely high-speed, low-altitude, over-flight
missile--on the order of M= 2-4 and altitudes measured in hundreds of feet.
Defense against such a missile would be difficult. The warhead would be of a down-
ward spray type of simple shapes (spherical) with perhaps no need for terminal
guidance when used over known enemy territory. Such a system could also carry
enhanced-radiation weapons. Structural considerations resulting from expected high
temperatures and pressure could be partially offset for a throw-away missile by
essentially designing to maintain system integrity only long enough to complete the
mission.
Air defense.- Surface-to-air missile systems for various purposes including field
army defense, fleet defense, and CONUS defense. Such systems must cover operational
envelopes from very low altitudes to very high altitudes and from relatively short
range to extremely long range. Rapid response is required which implies high speed
and, perhaps, vertical launch, particularly for firing-on-the-move from ground or sea
platforms. Thought should also be given to antiballistic missiles including tactical
as well as strategic defense.
Air superiority.- Already an obvious role for missile systems but one that could
benefit from longer range (over-the-horizon) capability, higher speeds, greater
maneuverability, and improved carriage and launch. Attention should also be given to
helicopter-launched systems.
Antishipping.- Considering the naval balance previously discussed, a need appears
to exist for air- and surface-launched missiles dedicated to antiship and antisub-
marine warfare. New systems should have large operational envelopes, high lethality,
high speed, and improved carriage/storage and launch.
Logistic.- Aircraft that might be contemplated for performing logistic support
may vary from one- to five-million pounds gross weight with payload fractions
approaching 50 percent. Ranges on the order of 10- to 12-thousand miles would be of
interest in carrying out missions from the continental U.S.
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
The use of missiles and aircraft in ways just described offer some unique oppor-
tunities for research and development. These opportunities by discipline areas
include:
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Aerodynamics
o Exploit interference flow fields
o Blended shapes
o Aerodynamic center management
o Reduced control forces
o Simple variable geometry
o Propulsion integration
o Vertical launch
o Laminar-flow control
Propulsion
o Multiple cycle
o Consumable motors
o Smokeless propellants
o Airbreathing concepts
o Reduced fuel consumption
o Higher temperature components
o Turboprop
o Digital controls
o Alternate fuels
Structures
o Composites
o Net shapes
o Light weight
o High strength
o Temperature tolerance
o Manufacturing techniques
o Produci bi 1ity
o Superplastic forming/diffusion bonding of titanium
o New materi a1s
o Advanced metallics
Avionics
o Distributed radar
o Innovative sensors
o Fiber optics
o Microprocesing
o Miniaturization
o Flight controls
o Innovative guidance
Others, of course, could be added but, needless to say, opportunities for research
and development abound.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is hoped that this paper has, to some degree, provided a clearer understanding
of Soviet military power and potential capability. With that understanding, it is
possible to determine some of the needs for a free-world response and to explore the
role of research and technology as part of a deterrent force.
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Briefly, the concluding observations are:
o The U.S.S.R. has developed a military capability that cannot be ignored.
o As a result, a creditable deterrent force having a worldwide capability of
rapid response would be desirable.
o Use should be made of missiles and missile/launcher combinations for reasons
related to penetrability, expendability, and affordability.
o Airplanes with long range and large payloads are desirable.
o Opportunities for innovative aerospace research and development abound.
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Figure 2.- Kirov cruiser armament.
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